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Social Distance and Affective Orientations1
Nedim Karakayali2
Most groups have social distance norms that differentiate ‘‘us’’ from ‘‘them.’’ Contrary to a wide-
spread assumption in the sociological literature, however, these normative distinctions, even when they
are collectively recognized, do not always overlap with the affective orientations of group members in
a uniform manner. Relations between normatively close members of a group are not always warm
and friendly, and normatively distant groups can sometimes be an object of reverence and love. In this
study, a typology of five different ways in which normatively distant groups can be perceived is pre-
sented: as competitors, allies, symbols of otherness, saviors, and ambivalent figures. Each type tends
to emerge under certain circumstances and triggers different affective orientations. This typology is
not a substitute for a general theory, but it aims to provide preliminary insights for investigating why
affective orientations toward normatively distant groups take different forms and, more generally, to
motivate further inquiry into the relationships between different dimensions of social distance.
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INTRODUCTION
How does social distance influence the affective content of social rela-
tions? More specifically, what different affective orientations might the mem-
bers of a group display toward groups they consider as distant from their
own? At least according to one frequently adopted perspective in the litera-
ture, such a question is essentially superfluous. From this point of view, strong
affective bonds are a sign of social proximity and relatedness. When social dis-
tance increases, relationships tend to lose their affective content or, worse,
negative affections dominate the relationship.3 In short, it is suggested that
there is a linear relation between distance and affectivity; social distance is
more or less identical to affective distance.
There have, of course, been other conceptions of social distance that do
not reduce it to affective distance. Beginning with Simmel’s (1950) and Park’s
1 I thank my colleague Dr. James Alexander for reading and commenting on an earlier version of
this article.
2 Department of Political Science, Bilkent University, 06800 Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey; e-mail:
nedim@bilkent.edu.tr.
3 For some of the most explicit statements of this observation in the classical literature, see
Bogardus (1941), Weber (1968:11–14), and Wood (1934:9).
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(1924) writings, sociologists have emphasized other—normative, interactive,
and cultural—aspects of the concept (more on this in the next section). But
even those scholars who view social distance as a complex category consisting
of multiple dimensions tend to subscribe to a linear model when it comes to
analyzing the relationships between its different dimensions. We can trace this
linearity assumption all the way back to one of the first users of the concept,
Gabriel Tarde (1962), who suggested that as the degree of imitation between
two groups increases, there builds up more cultural similarity and, therefore,
more social proximity between them. Several decades later, echoing Tarde,
Homans (1950) argued that positive affections between people would increase
with increased interaction. Applying the same logic to the closely affiliated
concept of social ties, Granovetter (1973:1361) states that ‘‘the strength of a
tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional
intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding) and the reciprocal services which
characterize the tie.’’ In short, in the sociological literature, it is a widespread
expectation that while in the short run there might be some discrepancy
between the dimensions of social distance, ‘‘[o]ver the long run,’’ these dimen-
sions are likely to ‘‘cluster so that there is but one dimension of social
distance’’ (Kadushin, 1962:520).
The truth of the matter, however, is that the very same ‘‘gap’’ that
Marsden and Campbell (1984) have identified in the conceptualization of
‘‘social ties’’ also exists for ‘‘social distance.’’ We know very little about the
interrelationships between the different indicators that have been used to mea-
sure social distance. The assumption that there must be a linear co-variation
between different dimensions of social distance is just that—an assumption.
Yet, as I will try to demonstrate in this article, there is much empirical
evidence that suggests that nonlinear associations between affective, norma-
tive, interactive, and cultural dimensions of social distance might last for very
long periods. In fact, in some cases, this nonoverlap might be a precondition
for the relationship to exist.
If so, then the question becomes under what circumstances different
aspects of distance vary linearly, and under what other conditions there are
nonlinear relations. In this article, I tackle a specific subset of that broad ques-
tion: Under what conditions does affective content of the relations between
groups that normatively view each other as ‘‘strangers’’ take on a positive or
negative value?
In what follows, I will first outline the different dimensions of social dis-
tance. Then, focusing particularly on the relationships between affective and
normative aspects of social distance, I will try to develop a preliminary typol-
ogy based on five major forms in which a socially distant member of a group
might be perceived by others: as a competitor, an ally, a symbol of otherness, a
savior, and an ambivalent being. Although I do not suggest that these types are
mutually exclusive, the last type seems to be unique to modern societies, and
it might already be going through a transformation since 9 ⁄11. Nevertheless,
each type tends to emerge under certain circumstances and triggers different
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emotional orientations. Some of these types are quite rigorously studied as
separate cases and partly overlap with different models of stranger-relations in
the sociological literature. Surveying them as a whole, however, might enable
us to identify some of the basic tendencies that underlie the formation of
diverse affective orientations toward normatively distant groups—a point that
I will elaborate on in the conclusion.
DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL DISTANCE
Social distance is generally understood as a uniquely sociological concept,
irreducible to spatial or biologic (genetic) distance. Especially in recent dec-
ades, research on technological ties has shown that people can experience
social distance and proximity without being ‘‘co-present’’ in the same physical
space (Cerulo, 1997; Chayko, 2002; Katz and Rice, 2002; Meyrowitz, 1997).
In a somewhat similar vein, one constant theme in the literature on ‘‘postmo-
dernity’’ has been the decreasing significance of locality and spatial con-
straints—what Harvey (1989) calls ‘‘annihilation of space through time’’—as a
result of the changes in economy and technology in the twentieth century. But
even those scholars who point out that spatial and biologic distance might
interact with social distance tend to agree that the concept should be treated
as an autonomous variable (Bourdieu, 1999; van den Berghe, 1987). Beyond
this general agreement, however, there seems to be at least four distinct ways
social distance is defined and utilized by social scientists. Let me briefly high-
light these four conceptions that build on the affective, normative, interactive,
and cultural aspects of social distance.
Social Distance as Affective Distance
This conception is based on the idea that those who are socially close to
us are those we feel close to, and vice versa. The most popular utilization of
this conception can be found in the Bogardus Social Distance Scale,4 devised
by Emory S. Bogardus (1925), according to whom, mutual sympathy and
affectivity are the key elements of social distance: ‘‘Where there is little
4 The Bogardus Social Distance Scale aims to measure how much social contact the informants
(from one social group) are willing to have with members of other specific social groups. With
this aim in mind, Bogardus (1925) used a questionnaire consisting of a set of seven questions
(which were later revised and expanded). The informant is asked whether s ⁄ he would be willing
to interact with the members of another specific group in one of the following forms, which can
be seen as different levels of closeness ⁄ distance: (1) marry ⁄ have as a kin; (2) be friends; (3) have
as a neighbor; (4) work together; (5) accept as a co-citizen (or ‘‘acquaintance’’); (6) accept as a
visitor in his ⁄ her country; or (7) does not accept at all within the borders of his ⁄ her country.
The Bogardus Scale is assumed to be a ‘‘cumulative’’ scale in the sense that answering ‘‘yes’’ to
a question at one level also implies a positive answer to all the other questions at the ‘‘lower’’
levels. For a critical history and different versions of the scale, see Ethington (1997).
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sympathetic understanding, social farness exists. Where sympathetic under-
standing is great, nearness exists’’ (Bogardus, 1941:106).
It is crucial to note here that such a conception treats social distance
essentially as a subjective category. The Bogardus Scale, for example, records
the subjective attitudes and feelings of the members of a group toward other
groups. Bogardus (1947:306) himself maintains that ‘‘[i]n social distance stud-
ies the center of attention is on the feeling reactions of persons toward other
persons and toward groups of people.’’
It would be quite vacuous to conceptualize social distance without any
reference to subjective attitudes and emotions; however, there is an almost
unsurpassable logical difficulty in treating social distance exclusively as a sub-
jective category. If an individual is to develop specific ‘‘emotional reactions’’
toward other groups, s ⁄he should already be able to identify those groups as
distinct categories. The Bogardus Scale, for example, is built on the implicit
assumption that informants have a general, collective understanding of who
does not belong to their own group when they answer a question like: ‘‘Would
you (as member of group A) like to live in the same neighborhood with a
member of group B?’’ In effect, what the Bogardus Scale measures is what the
members of a group feel about another group that they already perceive as
being distant ⁄distinct from their own group. All this indicates that there must
also be an ‘‘objective’’ or ‘‘structural’’ aspect of social distance.
Social Distance as Normative Distance
As Kadushin (1962:518) points out, already in Simmel’s work there were
allusions to the possibility of treating social distance as ‘‘an objectively obser-
vable quantity which varies from one social structure to another,’’ and about
which there exist ‘‘consciously expressed norms.’’5 Understood this way, a nor-
mative social distance system can be seen as a set of collectively recognized
norms about membership status in a group. These norms differentiate ‘‘us’’
from ‘‘them’’—either through clear-cut divisions or in a gradual form—and
specify what kind of relations with what kind of people are ‘‘acceptable.’’ Kin-
ship systems are probably the most obvious examples of such normative-objec-
tive systems of social distance. In addition to kinship, modern social
formations involve multiple systems of social distance where a host of different
criteria can be used to define who ‘‘belongs’’ and who does not (Simmel,
1955).
Whatever different forms they might take, however, all normative social
distance systems distinguish between different degrees of membership to a
group. It may be argued that as long as these distinctions overlap with the
subjective feelings of the members, they ‘‘work’’ well. It is also quite likely that
5 Durkheim (1964) also views social distance as an objective category (Hammond, 1983). For a
comparison of Simmel’s and Bogardus’s conceptions of social distance, see Ethington (1997).
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if there is a serious discrepancy between what the members feel and what the
normative system dictates, the system, if not ‘‘the group,’’ might eventually
dissolve. But, as I will try to show in this article, we have no reason to assume
that such an overlap always and necessarily occurs.
Social Distance as Interactive Distance
A third dimension of social distance concerns how frequently two groups
interact with each other. As Kadushin (1962:519) summarizes it, ‘‘[i]nteractive
distance is the degree of actual interaction and need not match the normative
prescriptions’’ (see also Warner and DeFleur, 1969). In the recent literature,
the most sustained analysis of interactive distance was performed by scholars
who adopt a network perspective. In Granovetter’s (1973) well-known work,
for example, the frequency and length of interaction are used as two major cri-
teria for deciding about the weakness or strength of a social tie. Not surpris-
ingly, interactive social distance also has a central significance in research on
the social consequences of Internet use (Chayko, 2002; Katz and Rice, 2002;
Meyrowitz, 1997).
Social Distance as Cultural and Habitual Distance
Gabriel Tarde (1962) was the first sociologist to propose that the distance
between two groups—especially two classes—can be derived from the degree
of imitation that exists between them (see Poole, 1927). In the subsequent liter-
ature, the emphasis seems to have shifted to the overall result of imitative pro-
cesses, that is, to cultural similarities or to what some scholars call
‘‘psychocultural distance’’ between two groups (Szalay and Maday, 1983). In
the contemporary literature, the most well-known use of cultural and habitual
distance was developed by Pierre Bourdieu (1990), who proposed that social
groups and classes can be mapped on a multidimensional ‘‘social space’’ on
the basis of the types and volume of ‘‘capital’’ they possess. World system the-
orists use a similar approach in distinguishing between the ‘‘center’’ and
‘‘periphery.’’ In Wallerstein’s work, the emphasis is on economic and techno-
logical similarities, but, as Cerulo (1993) points out, one might also view these
distinctions in terms of similarities and differences in the use of ‘‘national
symbols’’ (see also Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991).
BEYOND THE LINEAR MODEL: SIBLING RIVALRY
AND XENOPHILIA
Since the very beginning, then, the conceptualization of social distance
has involved multiple dimensions. As I noted earlier, however, little attention
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has been paid to the interaction between these dimensions, and it is often
readily assumed that they are interrelated in a linear fashion. There are, never-
theless, many observations in the literature implying that each aspect of social
distance is partly independent of the others. In this section, I briefly discuss
two situations in which the interaction between the normative and affective
dimensions of social distance cannot be accounted for by a linear model. The
first is when negative emotions, rivalry, hostility, and even violence erupt
among the members of a group who are normatively defined as close; the sec-
ond is when members of a group develop highly positive affections toward
outsiders and strangers, sometimes even at the expense of those who are
socially close to them.
The most obvious and extreme example of intense negative emotions
between close members of a group is murderous conflicts between first-degree
kin: fratricide, sororicide, patricide, matricide, and the like. In Western cul-
ture, these phenomena find their most paradigmatic expressions in the stories
of Abel and Cain, Romulus and Remus, and Oedipus Rex.
That such murderous conflicts between close kin are often narrated in
myths is quite remarkable. This, of course, does not necessarily mean that they
are pure fantasies. There are many empirical examples, both from Western
and non-Western societies, that testify to the presence of such conflicts (Davis,
2000), which is not so surprising since socially close members of a group often
share similar desires and they often compete for similar resources—inheri-
tance, power, sexual partners, and so forth—in the same environment. This is
what Bourdieu (1977:39) seems to have in mind when he writes that ‘‘the clos-
est genealogical relationship, that between brothers, is also the point of great-
est tension.’’
Many social scientists have noticed this tendency. Simmel (1971a:147), for
example, argued that a ‘‘trace of strangeness’’ is not absent from even the
most intimate relationships. In a similar fashion, Freud wrote: ‘‘The evidence
of psychoanalysis shows that almost every intimate emotional relation between
two people which lasts for some time—marriage, friendship, the relations
between parents and children—contains a sediment of feelings of aversion and
hostility, which only escapes perception as a result of repression’’ (Freud
1985:130).
Following Freud’s lead, Anton Blok (1998) has argued that ‘‘narcissism
of small differences’’ leads to violence and tension between both culturally and
normatively proximate groups—for example, between neighbors and friends—
rather than between significantly distant groups. Building on ethnographic
data, he further suggests that ‘‘great differences’’ and clearly defined distinc-
tions and hierarchies might often function as a source of stability and peace,
rather than intense violence. Incidentally, some of the most violent civil wars
in contemporary history—in Bosnia, among others—seem to lend support to
Blok’s arguments.
But perhaps the most radical and well-known theory in this context is
developed by René Girard (1987), who argues that ‘‘desire’’ spreads out in a
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collective like an epidemic through mimesis, leading to violent rivalry. Such
violence among brothers, according to Girard, was more widespread in earlier
human history, and myths are remnants of this violent past. Although it is
hard to ascertain the truth of this hypothesis, Girard is probably justified in
claiming that one of the major reasons such violence does not erupt more fre-
quently has much to do with strict prohibitions against ‘‘sibling rivalry’’ and,
more generally, against rivalry between group members in most cultures.6
Returning to the second case—that is, ‘‘xenophilia’’—we need to stress
that it has often been overlooked in the sociological literature that strong emo-
tional reactions toward strangers might also have a friendly nature. To begin
with, we can talk about the case of the ‘‘good stranger’’ who elicits equally
strong emotional reactions as the ‘‘bad’’ stranger. The story of Ruth, the
Moabite woman who joins the Israelites and unconditionally accepts their
God, is a striking example. As Kristeva (1991:72) points out, Boaz’s words in
the Old Testament seem to imply that Ruth’s reward is exceptional indeed:
‘‘May Yahweh reward you for what you have done! May perfect recompense
be made to you by Yahweh, the God of Israel, to whom you have come, to
find shelter beneath his wings’’ (Ruth 2:12). Kristeva (1991:73) suggests that
‘‘[o]ne cannot help emphasizing … that Ruth’s merit will be more sound than
that of Abraham, and therefore worthy of a perfect reward. Could this be
because Abraham left his father’s house in answer to a call from God, while
Ruth the foreigner did it on her own initiative?’’
In addition to the example of the ‘‘good stranger,’’ the ‘‘convert’’ who is
more loyal to the group than its native members, we can also consider exoti-
cism as another case in point. Especially in its modern forms, however, exoti-
cism as a form of xenophilia is not necessarily devoid of self-interest. The
fascination of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European writers with the
Orient, as Edward Said (1991) has pointed out, did not necessarily preclude a
desire for domination. Several authors have observed that much of Orientalist
writing involves a mixture of political and sexual desire for domination. As
Todorov points out in his analysis of Pierre Loti’s work, exoticism can easily
be ‘‘inverted to become nationalism, and xenophilia becomes xenophobia’’
(Todorov, 1993:318). Thus:
the exotic novel and the colonial novel can coexist so easily in the same author and dur-
ing the same years, whereas their intentions seem so contradictory: the one glorifies for-
eigners while the other denigrates them. But the contradiction is only apparent. Once
the author has declared that he himself is the only subject on board and that the others
have been reduced to the role of objects, it is after all of secondary concern whether
these objects are loved or despised. (Todorov, 1993:322–323)
Whatever the historically contingent peculiarities of European fascination with
the Orient might be, these observations should come as no surprise. That
6 In a very different domain, contemporary evolutionary biologists have shown that there are sig-
nificant limitations to the association between ‘‘altruistic’’ behavior and genetic affinity. Thus, in
his highly popular book on neo-Darwinian theory, Dawkins (1976) devotes two chapters to the
issue of rivalry between parents and offspring, and between siblings.
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xenophilia should be a form of disinterested love is an assumption that follows
from the linear model—where love toward ‘‘distant’’ people appears as an
exceptional form of ‘‘self-sacrifice.’’ If the linearity assumption is dropped,
positive bonds with strangers should appear as one possible strategy among
many for the investment of affective energies, and we have, then, no reason to
expect them to be devoid of self-interest.7
INVESTIGATING HOW RELATIONS WITH NORMATIVELY DISTANT
GROUPS CAN TAKE DIFFERENT FORMS: A TYPOLOGY
We are now ready to tackle the main problem of this article. If there is
no fixed relation between normative social distance and affective orientations,
then the question becomes under what conditions does this or that type of affec-
tive orientation develop between normatively distant members of a group. And,
no doubt, of special concern to most social scientists is to understand how
these orientations take on either a friendly or inimical form.
One fruitful way to approach that question is to look at the different
types of relations that the members of a society might form with those individ-
uals they perceive as belonging to a normatively distant group. Following
Simmel (1971a), I will call these ‘‘normatively distant’’ members ‘‘strangers.’’
Strangers are not simply outsiders but are perceived as being ‘‘distant’’ from
the rest of the group in some fundamental sense; they are, in Simmel’s words,
perceived as lacking a ‘‘vital substance’’ that others possess. Thus, although
strangers can be ‘‘near’’ to the group in other dimensions of social distance,
their normative distance looms large and overshadows their nearness, leading
to their identification as extraneous elements in the group. This situation might
be temporary (as in Schutz’s examples below), but it might also last for many
generations.
In this article, therefore, I do not exclusively associate the ‘‘stranger’’ with
any particular group. I use it in the sense of a certain social position that can
be filled by many different groups. It may be true that the category of the
stranger is often occupied by those ethnic and racial minorities in a society
who have immigrated to this society from elsewhere. The most classical exam-
ples of the stranger in the sociological literature, such as the European Jews
and Gypsies, and, to a lesser extent, immigrant groups in North America and
elsewhere, fit this definition. However, not all strangers can be defined in eth-
nic or racial terms. Metics in Ancient Greece, for example, did not constitute
and were not perceived as an ethnic group (Whitehead, 1977), nor was the
aubain, that is, the ‘‘outcast’’ peasant who took refuge in a feudal estate other
7 Many social scientists have pointed to the strategic role of positive bonds with strangers. As
Bourdieu (1977:57) puts it in the particular case of selection of spouses, if marrying someone
from one’s close circle has the advantage of ‘‘security,’’ marrying strangers might entail ‘‘alliance
and prestige,’’ and this choice ‘‘is posed anew with each marriage.’’ I will elaborate further on
this point below, in my discussion of alliances with strangers.
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than his ⁄her original estate in medieval Europe, always seen as belonging to a
particular ethnic group (Kristeva, 1991). In fact, some scholars, such as Alfred
Schutz, have included in this category such diverse groups as ‘‘[t]he applicant
for membership in a closed club, the prospective bridegroom who wants to be
admitted to the girl’s family, the farmer’s son who enters college, the city-
dweller who settles in a rural environment, the ‘selectee’ who joins the Army,
the family of the war worker who moves into a boom town’’ (Schutz,
1971:91).
The typology I present below lists five different forms in which the mem-
bers of a society might perceive and affectively orient themselves toward groups
they consider as being normatively distant from their own group. The underly-
ing structure of the typology is such that, in the first two types—competition
and alliance—what is at stake are material resources and political power. In the
remaining three types, in contrast, the emphasis is on the ‘‘symbolic’’ signifi-
cance of the stranger. These divisions are essentially analytic. I do not claim
that these types are mutually exclusive. Nor do I claim that the list is exhaus-
tive. Nevertheless, I believe it provides a good starting point for exploring the
complex nature of the relations between normative and affective social distance.
The Stranger as a Competitor
One major observation in the sociological literature is that negative emo-
tions toward strangers follow from conflicts over scarce resources and political
power. This thesis can be found in the works of contemporary scholars who
study ethnic and racial conflicts from a historical ⁄materialist point of view.
The proponents of this approach have diverse theoretical orientations, includ-
ing Marxian, Weberian, and sociobiological perspectives (Bonacich, 1973; Rex
and Mason, 1986; Van den Berghe, 1987; see also Hechter, 1978).
Needless to say, competition for resources (whether natural or socially con-
structed) is a very widespread phenomenon and can take a whole range of differ-
ent forms. The important point for our concerns here is that normatively distant
groups are not always perceived as competitors. One obvious precondition for
this to happen is that the competing groups must be relatively free to pursue the
same goals. Political and legal barriers (such as slavery) can hinder the develop-
ment of any significant competition between two groups. As Tocqueville (2002)
observed, prior to the U.S. Civil War, African Americans were seen as economic
or political rivals not in the South, but in the North where slavery was abolished.
In addition to such barriers, there can be all sorts of other mechanisms (such as
niche specialization) that might hinder the development of competitive relations
between normatively distant groups (van den Berghe, 1987).
But perhaps an equally important precondition is that each competing
group must be highly cohesive and solidaristic, which often occurs if the
groups are based on kinship and ethnic ties. In this context, the case that is
studied most closely is middlemen minorities who have been a target of violent
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attacks in many societies. In her oft-cited study, Edna Bonacich (1973) has
argued that such violence builds up over time as a result of the peculiar struc-
ture within which the interaction between middleman minorities and the host
society takes place. In response to their initial exclusion from the society at
large, members of the middlemen community develop strong solidaristic ties.
They invest forcefully into whatever venues are open to them, which often
allows them to be economically successful. In return, this success generates
even more distance and envy. Eventually, the mutual intensification of success
and envy turns into a ‘‘vicious circle.’’ Following a similar line of argumenta-
tion, van den Berghe (1987:144) adds:
Since MMs [middleman minorities] deal more directly and frequently with the masses
than the upper class, and since many of these encounters take place in a context of cul-
tural differences and misunderstandings and involve conflicts of interest, it is little won-
der that MMs become primary targets of hostility by the native masses.
Such negative emotions—which might sometimes have a mutual or reci-
procal character—can function as conscious or unconscious strategies for
excluding the other from competition: ‘‘Ethnic sentiments can be instanta-
neously mobilized in the defense of interests or even hysterically whipped up
in response to imaginary threats’’ (Van den Berghe, 1987:156).
The ‘‘competition model’’ provides important insights about material inter-
ests that might underlie affective orientations toward normatively distant mem-
bers of a group. It has, however, two significant shortcomings. First, in much of
the analysis mentioned above, the absence of affective bonds between strangers
and natives seems to be conflated with the presence of intense negative affections.
The fact is, however, that, for example, middlemen minorities might exist in a
society as a marginal group for long periods of time, interacting regularly with
others, even if mostly in a formal and distant manner. It is almost always in peri-
ods of rapid social change that they become targets of downright hostility. In
other words, negative affections tend to materialize only under certain circum-
stances. This means that ‘‘competition’’ alone might not be the sole factor in trig-
gering such affective responses. I will return to the significance of this point later.
Second, according to the ‘‘competition model,’’ negative emotions and
stereotypes essentially play a ‘‘secondary’’ or ‘‘ideological’’ role. They are
either ‘‘superstructural’’ effects of more primary struggles, or functional strate-
gies for securing material resources. Therefore, in contrast with the approaches
we will discuss after the next section, the proponents of the ‘‘competition
model’’ have paid little attention to the social-psychological mechanisms that
might underlie such emotions.
The Stranger as an Ally
It may be true that competition between two normatively distant groups
often leads to antagonistic relations. However, as Simmel (1971a) pointed out a
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long time ago, sometimes social distance can also play a productive role: the
members of a group can form certain relations with normatively distant groups
that they cannot form with each other (Karakayali, 2006). The stranger, under
certain circumstances, can operate as an ally as much as a competitor.
But what exactly are those circumstances that lead to alliances between
normatively distant groups? In fact, there seems to be three distinct ways such
alliances can be formed. The first one, which concerns cross-cultural alliances,
was observed by both Simmel (1971b) and Durkheim (1964) a long time ago.
Such alliances, they argued, often presuppose an increase in the size of a soci-
ety, combined with an increase in the division of labor: ‘‘differentiation and
individualization loosen the bond of the individual with those who are most
near in order to weave in its place a new one—both real and ideal—with those
who are more distant’’ (Simmel, 1971b:256; see also Hammond, 1983). For
example, the more stratified the society is and the more sharply class distinc-
tions stand out in it, the more the members of particular classes will tend to
develop a sympathy for people in other groups who occupy a similar position
in the social structure rather than other members of their own society. The
‘‘supra-nationalism’’ of the European nobility and the ‘‘internationalism’’ of
some working-class movements are among the most salient examples (Simmel,
1971b:253). In recent years, many scholars have observed another factor that
seems to encourage such alliances, namely, the existence of a medium (such as
the Internet) that increases the possibility of interaction between individuals
with similar social positions and ‘‘mental’’ dispositions despite social or geo-
graphic barriers (Chayko, 2002; Meyrowitz, 1997).
The second circumstance involves alliances between strangers and the ruling
elites in a society. Lewis Coser (1972) has paid much attention to the conditions
under which such alliances are forged. One precondition for such alliances, Coser
points out, is that the social divisions in a society must be going through a rapid
transition, leading to a widening gap between the ruling elites and the ‘‘native’’
subjects they rule. The rulers can no longer depend on their native subjects
because they fear that those subjects might either retaliate or attempt to seize
power. Instead, they ally themselves with strangers who do not have a foothold
in the society and who, therefore, are more likely to be loyal to them. Coser’s
analysis is supported by numerous historical cases: non-Muslim children who
were recruited for the elite staff and army of Ottoman rulers, the Court Jews of
Baroque Germany, the ‘‘slave soldiers’’ (Mamelukes) used by Islamic rulers of
Egypt, Jewish advisors who were employed in the Muslim courts of medieval
Spain, Swiss mercenaries who served French kings, Praetorian Guards of Roman
emperors, and the ‘‘eunuchs’’ who served Chinese emperors (Coser, 1972:575).
The pattern identified by Coser also seems to repeat in colonial contexts where
colonial rulers employ subjects they exported from elsewhere as ‘‘middlemen’’ in
order to avoid direct confrontation with the local population (Leighton, 1979).
Finally, strangers can also form alliances and mutually beneficial contacts
with estranged members of a group or with nonprivileged classes, although
especially the latter are relatively rare and little studied. A striking analysis of
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this type of alliance was provided by Hannah Arendt (1974), who shows how
the Jewish salons played a catalyzing role in the emergence of a new class (i.e.,
the bourgeoisie) in late eighteenth-century Germany. The salon of Rahel Varn-
hagen—a Jewish woman whose ties with her community were severed but who
was not fully accepted in the German society—constituted ‘‘a socially neutral
place where all classes met and where it was taken for granted that each per-
son would be an individual’’ (Arendt, 1974:38). Rahel’s salon, like many oth-
ers in Berlin, drew those individuals who had escaped the centripetal forces in
society and who were in ‘‘exile’’ from their group, such as the nobleman Finck-
enstein to whom Rahel was engaged (Arendt, 1974:39). Rahel’s case is an
example of subtle and intimate alliances between strangers and estranged or
underprivileged members of a group. The relations that were forged between
‘‘commoners’’ on the Hawaiian islands and Captain Cook’s crew might also
be cited as another striking example from a very different context (Sahlins,
1985). The history of religious movements involves similar examples (Weber,
1952; Zeitlin, 1984). Paul’s (of the Christian tradition) audience, as Kristeva
(1991:78) notes, ‘‘came from that part of the population that was ‘marginal to
the civic body’ [of the Roman Empire].’’
The affective dynamics of alliances with strangers is a relatively little stud-
ied topic in the sociological literature. The existing data seem to indicate that
in terms of affective orientations, alliances with strangers do not have a homo-
geneous outcome. As Coser (1972) suggests, the alliance of ruling classes with
strangers might not immediately give way to an increase in affective ties
because the alliance remains conditional on preservation of affective distance.
The stranger as an ally, in other words, remains useful as long as s ⁄he is a
loyal ‘‘servant.’’ As the isolation of the ruler from the rest of his or her sub-
jects increases, however, the loyal servant might eventually turn into a best
friend. The strong affection and trust that Chinese emperors, during certain
periods, have reportedly developed toward ‘‘eunuchs’’ is one such example
(Mitamura, 1963). In a somewhat similar vein, alliances between the estranged
members of a group and strangers might result in growing sentimental ties, as
in the case of the nobleman Finckenstein and Rahel Varnhagen.
As a corollary, it is important to note that in their alliances with ruling
groups as ‘‘servants of power,’’ strangers often occupy a passive position, but
in alliances with estranged members and lower classes or, more generally, in
alliances where affective ties are strong, strangers seem to play a more active
and transformative role. In other words, in the former case, they basically
serve the establishment of a social division, whereas in the latter, they catalyze
the emergence of divisions (more on this point in the conclusion).
The Stranger as a Symbol of Otherness
That negative affective orientations toward strangers can develop quite
independent of competition for scarce resources has been emphasized by
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contemporary scholars who focus on the social-psychological or symbolic
dimensions of stranger-relations. One of the most obvious examples of this
approach can be found in Levine (1979:29–30), who utilizes Freud’s theory,
which links aversion toward strangers to assertion of self-love, referring to the
following passage from his essay on ‘‘Group Psychology.’’
In the undisguised antipathies and aversions which people feel towards strangers with
whom they have to do we may recognize the expression of self-love—of narcissism. This
self-love works for the self-assertion of the individual, and behaves as though the occur-
rence of any divergence from his own particular lines of development involved a criti-
cism of them and a demand for their alteration. (Freud 1985:131)
Here, aversion toward strangers is understood as a psychological mechanism
and there is no reference to an underlying material struggle. The only concern
is the preservation of ‘‘self-identity’’: xenophobia springs forth from ‘‘self-
love.’’
Let us briefly note, however, that Freud’s analysis is not based on a
dyadic opposition between the self and the other. As Borch-Jacobsen (1988)
shows, implicit in Freud’s theory of narcissism is the idea that the ‘‘self’’
is already an ‘‘other’’—has to be an ‘‘other’’—in order to be loved (see also
Blok, 1998). In fact, in ‘‘Group Psychology,’’ Freud (1985) anticipates a tri-
adic conception of stranger-relations, where the ‘‘self’’ or the ‘‘group’’
confronting the ‘‘stranger’’ is viewed as a ‘‘divided entity’’ and not as a
self-contained unity. This triadic conception has also been utilized in many
classical works in the sociological literature dealing with social deviance in
general and the sources of negative reactions against strangers in particular.
Probably the best-known example here is Durkheim’s (1982) theory that
crime is not simply pathological and that the punishment of criminals plays
an integrative function: the animosity felt toward the criminal as a ‘‘third
party’’ holds the other members together and strengthens the moral ties
among them. In a similar vein, Simmel (1971a) relates negative reactions
toward strangers to internal conflicts among group members. The link that
Simmel draws between internal rivalries in a group and negative reactions
toward strangers can be observed in a widespread phenomenon, namely, the
treatment of strangers as scapegoats. Simmel’s argument is based on a fre-
quently observed fact, namely, that scapegoating of strangers gains an impe-
tus in times of crisis when a society is going through radical transformations
and when the rival factions in a group begin to attack each other virulently.8
A somewhat similar observation can be found in Max Weber’s work on
polytheism and magic, where the fear from ‘‘religious aliens’’ is interpreted
as following from doubts about the loyalty of the ancestral gods to the
group. These doubts, in return, seem to be closely associated with doubts
about the fidelity of the members of the group to the political association
(Weber, 1964:15–18).
8 ‘‘From earliest times, in uprisings of all sorts the attacked party has claimed that there has been
incitement from the outside, by foreign emissaries and agitators’’ (Simmel, 1971a:146).
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These classical sociologists anticipate René Girard’s (1986) thesis that,
throughout history, strangers have served as scapegoats to deflect potential
conflicts between ‘‘brothers.’’ A detailed discussion of Girard’s theory, which
explores the links between desire, violence, and the ‘‘sacred,’’ is beyond the
scope of this article. For our specific concerns here, however, the gist of
Girard’s observations can be summarized by the following comments of
Freud: ‘‘[H]atred against a particular person or institution might operate in
just the same unifying way, and might call up the same kind of emotional ties
as positive attachment’’ (Freud, 1985:129–130). These observations suggest
that hating—and perhaps even loving9—a ‘‘third party’’ might function as a
mechanism that strengthens affective bonds among the members of a group
that might have otherwise dissolved due to internal conflict.
The phenomenon of scapegoating teaches us that hostile accusations
toward strangers often have a nonrational and fantastic nature. This observa-
tion has led many social scientists to consider xenophobia as a symptom either
of deeper social problems or, more generally, of a repressed fear from the
‘‘stranger within.’’10 Most notably, using anti-Semitism as a basic example,
Adorno et al. (1950) have argued that the stranger as a target of hostility is
essentially a ‘‘substitute object’’ for the repressive social forces that the indi-
vidual cannot confront directly. Such hostile reactions are ‘‘not so much
dependent upon the nature of the object as upon the subject’s own psychologi-
cal wants and needs’’ (Adorno et al., 1950:609).
The Stranger as a Savior
Analyses offered by scholars such as Girard and Adorno contribute in
important ways to our understanding of the links between xenophobia and
psychosocial processes. The problem is that their analyses give us a one-sided
picture: affective orientations in stranger-relations appear to be solely deter-
mined by the nature of the relations among ‘‘natives.’’ When the latter set of
relations turns sour and frustrating (or ‘‘repressive’’), the former provides a
kind of outlet for these frustrations. As such, stranger-relations appear to have
no ‘‘positive’’ (i.e., transformative) effect whatsoever on the relations among
the ‘‘natives.’’
9 In fact, both Girard and Freud, albeit in very different ways, suggest that the collective ‘‘love’’
felt for a violently murdered victim whose death brings peace and stability to a group is at the
origin of human culture.
10 Thus, despite their divergent approaches, both Adorno et al. (1950:609) and Kristeva
(1991:182–192), along with many others, adopt the Freudian notion of the ‘‘uncanny’’ to
conceptualize xenophobia and to draw support for their claim that the stranger operates as a
‘‘substitute’’ for a repressed object of fear. An uncanny object, for Freud (1973), belongs to a
particular class of ‘‘frightening’’ objects that do not seem to constitute a direct threat to us but
nevertheless send a shiver down our spine in an inexplicable manner. Such objects appear to us
‘‘uncanny’’ not because they are completely unfamiliar or new; rather, ‘‘[t]he uncanny is some-
thing which is secretly familiar, which has undergone repression and then returned from it, and
that everything that is uncanny fulfils this condition’’ (Freud 1973:245).
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In this respect, the perception of strangers as saviors is almost a perfect
counterpoint to their perception as a symbol of otherness. Such a perception
is already implicit in the myths and legends of numerous societies ‘‘that men-
tion the existence of superior and kindly beings beyond their own world’’
(Tuan, 1986:12). Many of these legends narrate the good results of encounters
with strangers. The idea is not limited to ancient myths; many texts of the
Enlightenment era (Willey, 1965) and contemporary films such as Kurusawa’s
Seven Samurai and Spielberg’s E.T. repeat the same theme. As Mary
Helms’s (1988) synthesis of a wide range of historical and anthropological
data indicates, however, the stranger as a savior is by no means just a legend-
ary figure.
What are the conditions under which strangers can be perceived as saviors?
There seems to be two interrelated reasons for such a development. The first rea-
son is partly alluded to in Simmel’s (1971a) work, where he pointed out that
because strangers occupy a distinct position in a group, they can often accom-
plish certain vital tasks in the group that other, ‘‘native’’ members are less likely
to accomplish.11 In this respect, one case that is well studied in the literature is
the capacity of strangers to work as arbitrators in a group that consist of rival
factions, mainly because the strangers are capable of preserving an equal affec-
tive and normative distance to all the factions (Colson, 1966; Simmel, 1950:216).
Referring to the groups inhabiting the area between Lakes Malawi and Tang-
anyika in South Africa, Monica Wilson (1979:56–57) notes that:
[O]ne people after another tell of how their chiefs came as strangers and were welcomed
as benefactors. Before they came, authority did not extend beyond one village. They
were welcomed because they brought ‘‘lordship’’ symbolized by fire; because they
brought iron weapons and tools; cattle; and new crops … [There were groups] who had
no chiefs carrying off the son of a chief from elsewhere and establishing him among
themselves to stop fighting. Order in society is, after all, one of the things men seek,
and the outsider sometimes has the prestige which an insider lacks to maintain order.
One form in which strangers can take on the role of a savior, then, is by mak-
ing practical contributions to a community, especially through arbitration, on
the basis of partly the practical and partly the symbolic value attributed to
their ‘‘distance.’’ But there is also a second, and perhaps more striking, form
in which strangers become saviors, namely, by providing spiritual guidance
and esoteric knowledge, as ‘‘men of learning from afar’’ (Helms, 1988:94).
This capacity is once again related to the distance of the stranger—in both a
geographic and sociocultural sense—which, Helms (1988:4) suggests, follows
from the widespread belief that ‘‘as one moves away from axis mundi one
moves towards places and people that are increasingly ‘different’ and, there-
fore, may be regarded as increasingly supernatural, mythical, and powerful,
the more distant they are from the heartland.’’
Especially in premodern societies, one way to tap into these alleged
mythical powers was through long-distance travel. Upon their return
home, long-distance travelers would often be viewed as possessors of esoteric
11 See Karakayali (2006) for a detailed discussion of these ‘‘tasks.’’
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knowledge and endowed with prestige and honor.12 But these attributes would
be all the more emphasized ‘‘in situations where long-distance specialists were
ethnically foreign to the polity in which they lived and served’’ (Helms,
1988:94). There are so many examples of strangers who were respected as
spiritual guides in the literature. Hausa and Dyula migratory traders in Africa,
for example, ‘‘have traditionally served as administrative advisers, consultants,
diviners, prayer makers, curers, and especially sellers of the reputedly most
potent Muslim charms and amulets to royalty and commoners alike’’ (Helms,
1988:97). Nestorian missionaries enjoyed a similar prestige in western and cen-
tral Asia (Helms, 1988:103–105). Jesuit fathers in China were yet ‘‘another
supreme example of a group of foreigners of undoubted learning coming from
a distant land who were imbued with an aura of the exotic by virtue of their
foreignness and were accorded highest honors at a royal court as men of great
wisdom and knowledge and as masters of specialized arts and crafts’’ (Helms,
1988:105). The spread of Christianity in the Roman Empire can also be cited
as a relevant example here. As Sennett (1977:3) points out, when at the end of
the Augustan age affective bonds among Roman citizens began to weaken and
public life became a mere formality, some of these citizens sought ‘‘a new
focus for [their] emotional energies, a new principle of commitment and
belief,’’ which they found in Near Eastern sects.
The stranger as a savior constitutes a striking contrast to the stranger as
a scapegoat in many respects. In terms of the symbolic value attributed to
‘‘distance,’’ in the former case, distance is associated with benevolence, wis-
dom, and objectivity; in the latter, with a threatening otherness. Again, in the
former case, the stranger plays an active and transformative role, while in the
latter, s ⁄he turns into a passive victim. We can identify many cases where both
types confront a society where affective bonds between socially close members
of a group are in the process of eroding. However, while in the case of scap-
egoating, it is negative emotions such as hatred and fear that are rerouted
toward the normatively distant groups, in the case of the savior, the stranger
becomes an attractor of positive affections.
Why one or the other route is taken seems to depend on a host of factors
and it is perhaps impossible to develop a general theory that encompasses all
empirical cases. But the most conspicuous factor seems to be the nature of
past relations between two groups. If there is a long history of conflictual rela-
tions as, for example, in the case of Jews, Christians, and Muslims, the
chances of one group viewing the other as a savior seem to diminish. Strangers
in the role of saviors tend to emerge when two groups have had little encoun-
ter in the past, such as the tribal groups and Muslim traders in Africa, or
Jesuit fathers and Chinese rulers. Paradoxically enough, the less the group
knows about the strangers and the fewer stereotypes it has about them, the
better, it seems, are the chances for the strangers to be accepted as benevolent
12 It can be argued that a similar attitude persists in the modern world since being educated
abroad—particularly in the West—is a source of prestige in many societies also today.
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figures. This lack of knowledge, especially in premodern societies, is closely
associated with geographic distance. Numbers also seem to be a factor, since
strangers in the role of saviors often consist of a few individuals, which per-
haps reduces their chances of being perceived as a serious political threat (see,
e.g., Wilson, 1979:52).
The Stranger as an Ambivalent Figure
The four types we have analyzed so far indicate that, potentially, a stran-
ger might be a competitor as well as an ally; an object of hatred as well as of
reverence. In fact, it is not unusual that such contrasting attitudes are present
simultaneously in the same society. Middleman minorities, for example, have
often been in a relation of competition with the local population, while they
were allies with the ruling groups. The same is sometimes true for the stranger-
savior: ‘‘[f]oreign wise men, because they are sagacious, can also pose a threat
to local men of knowledge,’’ and hence be viewed as a symbol of otherness
(Helms, 1988:108). On the basis of such observations, some scholars refer to ‘‘a
persisting ambivalence underlying all stranger relationships’’ (Levine, 1979:30).
This assumption, however, should be carefully qualified. As Zygmunt
Bauman (1991) has pointed out, while there might be some type of emotional
and cognitive ambivalence in most stranger-relations, the conception of the
stranger as an ambivalent figure—or, perhaps, more precisely, as an ambiva-
lence-inducing figure—is predominantly a modern phenomenon.
It is, in fact, mostly in research on modern international migration that
the ambivalence of the stranger is emphasized. At least since Marcus Lee
Hansen’s (1952) pioneering work on the topic, there has emerged a vast
sociological literature that reiterates the thesis that immigrants and especially
their children are caught between two cultures, that they have allegiance to
two different sets of norms, that they are both insiders and outsiders, and so
forth. This idea was first developed in the early twentieth century in the con-
text of immigration to North America and it has since then been applied to
numerous other contexts, particularly to postwar European societies (Kara-
kayali, 2005).
How can we account for this metamorphosis in the conception of the
stranger in the modern era? What conditions in modern society trigger the per-
ception of the stranger as an ambivalent figure? It was again Simmel who first
tried to propose an answer to that question, and much of the contemporary
theorizing on the topic echoes his proposition.
It has sometimes been argued that Simmel’s concept of the stranger is
quite useless in the modern context, since he developed the concept on the
basis of premodern cases (Harman, 1988). However, while it is true that
Simmel’s writings involve almost no reference to international migration in the
late nineteenth century, he did in fact underline that ‘‘strangers in the original
sense no longer exist today’’ (Simmel, 1990:227). The main reason for this
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change, however, has little to do with the characteristics of modern strangers;
rather, it follows from a series of radical transformations in modern society,
especially the growth of market economy and urbanization.
The gist of Simmel’s argument, which he states in the context of the
spread of money economy, is that in modern society, the contrasts that existed
between natives and strangers are no longer so visible and easily sustainable
(Simmel, 1990:227). This does not necessarily mean that there are no strangers
anymore but, as he would reiterate in his well-known essay on metropolis, the
relations between modern urbanites resemble stranger-relations in most
aspects. Perin’s (1988) work, where she shows how much neighbors in the con-
temporary United States doubt each other and avoid direct communication,
implies that Simmel’s observations are still valid today. To put it in slightly
different terms, both strangeness and ‘‘nativity’’ become problematic and
ambiguous notions in modern societies.
A similar argument is implicit in Weber’s work on ancient Judaism, where
he notes that, with the birth of monotheism and the invention of the notion of
berith, one can no longer entertain the idea that social unrest and disunity are
the outcome of magical processes, or a result of the conspiracy of strangers,
but must realize that they are real risks engraved in the very nature of social
and political relations (Weber, 1952:118). In the long run, the development of
monotheism—which Weber seems to associate with a growing rationalization
in religious and political domains—gives the members of the religiopolitical
community an inclination toward ‘‘self-questioning’’ (Zeitlin, 1984). At the
same time, with respect to strangers, the problem now is not so much how to
exclude them from sacred ⁄ secret domains but how to turn them into loyal
members of the group (Bodemann, 1993). We might even talk about a kind of
‘‘disenchantment of native-stranger division’’: as the ‘‘natives’’ begin to ques-
tion themselves and the legitimacy of their political institutions, the stranger
becomes a potential native who can be ‘‘integrated’’ to the group through the
use of correct procedures.13
Simmel’s and Weber’s observations are repeated in numerous contempo-
rary works on stranger-relations that emphasize the ethical, political, and
philosophical difficulties involved in making clear distinctions in modern socie-
ties between the native and the stranger (Bauman, 1991; Derrida, 2000;
Girard, 1986; Kristeva, 1991; Räthzel, 1995).
What is crucial for our concerns in this article is that a new type of affec-
tive orientation toward strangers seems to have arisen as a result of this dou-
ble ambivalence about the ‘‘self’’ and the ‘‘other,’’ which is not observable in
13 It might perhaps be possible to view these changes in stranger relations in parallel to another
change in modern society identified by Foucault (1977): the shift from exclusionary toward dis-
ciplinary power, which targets pervasive surveillance of all individuals in society. In this disci-
plinary regime of power, as ‘‘deviance’’ is perceived as a disease that can be cured with correct
methods, ‘‘normality’’ appears as an unstable condition that might turn into its opposite
without proper discipline.
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the other four types of relations discussed above. This affective orientation
can be characterized as a generalized anxiety.
Zygmunt Bauman (1991) has paid much attention to the sources of this
anxiety in modern societies. At the roots of this anxiety is the well-known
dilemma of modern culture: on the one hand, modernity constantly produces
change and ambiguity; on the other, it involves a desire to cover up or elimi-
nate this ambiguity by appealing to clear-cut distinctions between the self and
the other, the inside and the outside, culture and nature, and so on. The inter-
active and spatial proximity of groups that are considered to be normatively
distant, however, reveal the difficulty in sustaining such clear distinctions (see
also Zerubavel, 1993). In effect, the stranger is not an ambivalent being, but
s ⁄he is an ‘‘ambivalence-inducing’’—or, perhaps, an ‘‘ambivalence-reveal-
ing’’—social category.
Analyses similar to Bauman’s are quite widespread in the recent literature.
In most of these studies (some of which are directly inspired by Bauman’s
work), anxieties about and aggression toward strangers are associated with the
fact that the presence of strangers dismantles the taken-for-granted self-repre-
sentation of the group. It is, for example, a widespread observation that immi-
gration motivates debates and controversies about the ‘‘essential’’
characteristics of a nation. Verkuyten et al. (1995:258), for example, show how
the presence of immigrants affects the conception of ‘‘Dutch identity’’ among
the inhabitants of an ethnically mixed neighborhood in Rotterdam. Similarly,
on the basis of her research in Germany, Nora Räthzel (1995:59) concludes
that the ‘‘images of ‘Ausländer’ are threatening because they make our taken-
for-granted ‘identities’ visible as specific ‘identities,’ depriving them of their
assumed naturalness.’’
These studies imply a certain difference between the stranger as a scape-
goat and the stranger as an ambivalent figure. In the case of scapegoating, the
internal turmoil in the group precedes or is independent of the presence of the
stranger, whereas in the latter case, the anxiety comes into existence because
with the appearance of the stranger, the group can no longer perceive itself in
the same way as before. However, as both Bauman and Adorno point out, the
anxiety induced by the stranger in modern society can easily give way to the
‘‘uncanny’’ fear and hatred felt toward a scapegoat.
One final issue I would like to mention before ending this section con-
cerns the developments in the aftermath of 9 ⁄11. Is the conception of the
stranger going through yet a new transformation in our time? While it is per-
haps too early to give a clear answer to that question, three important changes
are worth mentioning. First, since 9 ⁄11, all over the globe, religious identity
seems to have become the main criterion of normative distance. The distinc-
tion between ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them,’’ ‘‘inside’’ and ‘‘outside,’’ seems to be reconfig-
ured along religious lines. Second, given the heterogeneous and cosmopolitan
nature of contemporary societies, this ‘‘outside’’ is becoming growingly unloc-
alizable and hard to pin-point, multiplying the ‘‘ambivalence’’ effect (Faist,
2002). Finally, as a corollary to these developments, a new paradigmatic type
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of the stranger emerges as a potential religiopolitical competitor, as well as an
anxiety- and fear-inducing other (Huddy et al., 2005). In short, all the negative
affective orientations identified in this article seem to become amalgamated in
this new figure of the stranger as a ‘‘potential enemy,’’ leaving little room for
the more positive relations that have historically been formed with normatively
distant groups.
CONCLUSION
I started this article by questioning the widespread assumption that
there is a linear correlation between different dimensions of social distance.
The typology I sketched out above indicates that this assumption, at least
for two dimensions of social distance, is rather untenable. Such a typology,
however, is far from providing a full-fledged theory about how dimensions
of social distance relate to each other. Nevertheless, in concluding this arti-
cle, I would like to offer one general proposition, some elements of which
were already mentioned in the preceding sections: different affective orienta-
tions toward normatively distant groups seem to arise partly in reaction to
ongoing social differentiation and conflicts between normatively close members
of a group. There seems to be two diametrically opposed ways this can take
place.
1. In societies with significant internal divisions and rivalry, normatively
distant groups can play a ‘‘unifying role’’ by constituting either a com-
mon object of love or hate. The first option is exemplified by strangers
as saviors, especially when they act as arbitrators, ‘‘spiritual guides,’’
or ‘‘charismatic’’ leaders who offer hope, skills, and wisdom to a group
in turmoil (Helms, 1988; Wilson, 1979). With respect to the second
option, let us note that while competition for material resources and
power might play a certain role in the development of negative affec-
tive orientations toward strangers, this option is most vividly exempli-
fied by the stranger as a scapegoat. For it is especially in this case that
stranger-relations constitute a domain into which the anger and hatred
resulting from internal rivalry are reinvested. These two types, how-
ever, are not mutually exclusive. As in the case of middlemen minori-
ties, they might easily merge into each other and the stranger might be
perceived both as a competitor and as a symbol of otherness. As I have
already underlined, we still need much more data to grasp under what
conditions strangers become objects of love or hate but, in light of the
limited number of cases we have analyzed, the nature of past relations,
absence or presence of knowledge and stereotypes about the norma-
tively distant groups, geographic distance, and numbers seem to be the
most salient factors.
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2. At the opposite extreme, strangers can play a ‘‘divisive’’ role by con-
stituting an alternative venue for the investment of affective energies
for certain members of a group. Thus, new affective ties formed with
strangers might either help preserve existing divisions between the
members of a group or directly trigger and catalyze their emergence.
The most obvious case here is that of the stranger as a ‘‘servant of
power,’’ who can become instrumental in the preservation of a divi-
sion between a ruling elite and its native subjects, though not all such
alliances give way to strong affective ties. In some other forms of alli-
ances and in some versions of the stranger as a savior, however, the
estranged members of a group who no longer ‘‘feel close’’ to others
in their group might instead form affective bonds with other groups
and cultures. Thus, stranger-relations constitute a domain for rein-
vestment of positive affections that can no longer be invested in rela-
tions with socially proximate members. As such, the stranger becomes
an ‘‘escape-route’’ rather than a ‘‘scapegoat.’’
These two tendencies—which highlight the capacity of the stranger for
both subduing and triggering social divisions, and for constituting both an
object of love and hate—indicate that how people relate to socially distant
groups is a function of how they relate to socially proximate members of their
own society and vice versa. This implies a triadic rather than a dyadic-linear
configuration. The two tendencies we have outlined are indeed just a specific
subset of structural tendencies of triadic relations, first discussed by Simmel
(1950), and further elaborated by Heider (1958) in his ‘‘balance theory.’’
However, while a triadic model can be a good starting point in developing
a theory about the dynamics of social distance, the two structural tendencies
outlined above are not meant to be a substitute for empirical research. What
Lynn Chancer (1992) observes with respect to the ‘‘dynamics of power and
powerlessness’’ might apply equally well to the dynamics of distance and near-
ness. A theoretical model that specifies the tendencies in a relationship is never
enough to predict its exact outcome because this outcome ‘‘depends on a com-
plex set of historical, social, and psychological circumstances that pull its
tendencies in unpredictable directions’’ (Chancer, 1992:67).
In fact, the dynamic of social distance is even more complex than it seems
since most of the cases we have analyzed indicate that the two tendencies out-
lined above often co-exist. For example, at any given time in a society, we are
likely to observe that there is some internal differentiation and rivalry, which,
along with other factors such as competition, motivate negative affective ori-
entations toward strangers, just as there is perhaps some positive contact with
strangers that triggers internal differentiation. This complexity becomes more
visible when we shift our attention from premodern societies with limited
social differentiation to modern societies. It seems that when social differentia-
tion in a society goes beyond a certain threshold, rendering the distinction
between social proximity and distance ambiguous, the relationship between
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affective and normative distance becomes all the more erratic and nonlinear.
Thus, not surprisingly, in contemporary societies we find the most tolerant
and the most systematically violent attitudes against strangers side by side.
Ours is, no doubt, the age of the most universalistic as well as the most paro-
chial political doctrines.
Inquiring further into the diverse forms that relations with normatively
distant groups can take might also have practical implications. Most
importantly, it can work as an antidote against two rather naı̈ve and ‘‘homog-
enizing’’ conceptions of the stranger that are common to both scholarly and
popular texts, that is, either as a totally passive sacrificial lamb, the target of
unjustifiable and irrational accusations, or as a ‘‘potential enemy’’ with unlimi-
ted magical powers for destroying and destabilizing society.
Finally, a few words are in order concerning the broader sociological
significance of this analysis. Like most norms, norms of social distance often
posit clear-cut distinctions that organize our perception of social reality, pro-
vide short-cuts in our relations with others, and make life easier for us.
Durkheim (1964) was probably right when he suggested that such norms are
the crystallization of long-term emotional investments and that they actually
fulfill important functions (Hammond, 1983). However, the fact that many
different relations can develop across these normative divisions and that their
affective content can show considerable variation implies that these crystal-
lized norms often fail to impose their totalizing perspective on social rela-
tions. The practical concerns of the actors involved, their historical memory,
their fears and desires, and the technologies they can utilize, among other
factors, all shape the relations they form with socially distant (or near)
groups and the affections that flow through such relations. If we broadened
the analysis here by taking interactive and cultural dimensions of social dis-
tance as well, we would most probably observe even further variation and
diversity. It might very well be that the possibilities for variation are not
endless, but is it not still a worthy task for us to figure out what other pos-
sibilities are there?
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